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I.

INTRODUCTION

V.

Amazon designed the virtual personal assistant, Alexa, and
programmed the virtual assistant in millions of Alexa-enabled devices,
creating a large class of smart devices that now reside in American
homes and offices. 1 However, any convenience gained from Alexaenabled devices, such as Amazon’s Echo device, creates significant
privacy concerns. Engagement with an Alexa-enabled smart home
device puts the user at risk of exposing personal and incriminating data
to law enforcement even before they obtain a search warrant based on
probable cause. Of significant concern is that the Supreme Court of
the United States has not ruled on whether it is constitutional for law
enforcement to obtain Alexa-enabled smart home data without a
warrant supported by probable cause.
Recently, law enforcement used the recordings from Alexaenabled smart home devices in at least three criminal case
investigations. A judge in New Hampshire ordered Amazon to release
recordings from an Alexa-enabled Echo device located in a home

1 Ben Fox Rubin, Amazon sees Alexa Devices More Than Double in Just One Year, C|NET
(Jan. 6, 2020, 6:00 a.m.), https://www.cnet.com/news/amazon-sees-alexa-devices-more-thandouble-in-just-one-year/.
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where two women were fatally stabbed. 2 In a similar case, the
defendant, under criminal investigation, voluntarily gave up the
recordings from the Alexa-enabled Echo device. 3 In other situations,
law enforcement obtained warrants for the recordings from Alexaenabled Echo devices located in homes. 4 While the government’s use
of Alexa-enabled smart home data in criminal prosecution proceedings
is not yet prevalent, the use of this data without constitutional restraints
poses significant privacy concerns.
The framers of the United States Constitution did not have
reason to develop law concerning the government’s use of smart
technology to acquire, store, and analyze personal information about
Americans. 5 When the founding fathers drafted and ratified the
Constitution, there were no electronic devices such as satellites, digital
cameras, and computers. Today, Global Positioning Systems (GPS)
provide the velocity, location, and time of cars and airplanes. 6 A Ford
Motor representative stated, “[w]e know everyone who breaks the law.
We know when you’re doing it. We have GPS in your car, so we know
what you’re doing.” 7 Recently, the Supreme Court recognized the
growth of cellphone use by stating, “[t]here are 396 million cell phone
service accounts in the United States . . . for a Nation of 326 million
people.” 8 Furthermore, the current Alexa-enabled smart home devices
transmit data displaying continuous and intimate patterns of users’
routines, habits, thoughts, and other daily life activities. Thus,

Debra Cassens Weiss, Judge Orders Amazon to Provide Echo recordings in Double
J.
(Nov.
12,
2018),
Homicide
Case,
ABA
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/judge_orders_amazon_to_provide_echo_recordings
_in_double_homicide_case.
3 Id.
4 Kayla Epstein, Police Think Amazon’s Alexa May Have Information on a Fatal Stabbing
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
2,
2019),
Case,
THE
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/11/02/police-think-amazons-alexa-mayhave-information-fatal-stabbing-case/.
5 See Meg Leta Jones, Privacy Without Screens & the Internet of Other People’s Things, 51
IDAHO L. REV. 639, 641 (2015) (“These devices will send data from the device in the home
out to the cloud, leaving their private nature uncertain, and many others will be designed to
operate outside the home, like driverless cars, wearables, and smart retailers.”).
6 What is GPS and How Does it Work?, MEDALLION GPS (Jul. 19, 2018),
https://medalliongps.com/blogs/medallion-car-tracking-and-protection/what-is-gps-and-howdoes-it-work.
7 Stephen E. Henderson, Our Records Panopticon and the American Bar Association
Standards for Criminal Justice, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 699, 705 (2014).
8 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018).
2
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technology has rapidly advanced since the enactment of the
Constitution.
Law enforcement’s unchecked access to Alexa-enabled smart
home devices contravenes the framers’ intent to protect Americans
from unreasonable governmental searches and seizures, notably within
one’s home. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
is a response to the “‘writs of assistance’ of the colonial era, which
allowed British officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained
search for evidence of criminal activity.” 9 As a result, the framers of
the Constitution created specific guidelines to administer search
warrants in the United States.
Contrary to England’s “colonial writs of assistance,” 10 the
Fourth Amendment requires specificity to execute search warrants.
Alexa-enabled smart home devices continue to grow in sophistication,
and whether law enforcement’s use of this data is constitutional
requires an examination of the Fourth Amendment.
This Note addresses how the Fourth Amendment should
protect data collected from Alexa-enabled smart home devices against
unlawful governmental search and seizure. Specifically, this Note
analyzes Supreme Court cases discussing technological advancements
and demonstrates how current federal law can protect Alexa-enabled
smart home devices. This Note also demonstrates how redefining the
Fourth Amendment’s term “effects” can expand its scope to protect
Alexa-enabled smart home devices and the data they radiate. Also,
this Note analyzes Andrew Ferguson’s theory of digital curtilage 11 and
shows how this new framework can be used by judges to protect the
data collected from Alexa-enabled smart home devices.
This Note is divided into seven parts. Part II of this Note
discusses the societal benefits derived from the Alexa-enabled smart
home device. Part III focuses exclusively on Supreme Court cases
regarding the Fourth Amendment and its application towards different
electronic devices. Part IV demonstrates how current federal law can
protect Alexa-enabled smart home devices from unreasonable searches
or seizures. Part V shows how redefining the Fourth Amendment’s
term “effect” can expand its scope to protect Alexa-enabled smart
devices. Part VI presents the theory of “digital curtilage” and discusses
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014).
Id.
11 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of Effects,
104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 809 (2016).
9

10
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how this new framework can protect Alexa-enabled smart devices and
the data they radiate. Lastly, Part VII concludes with a summary of
the methods used in this Note to protect Alexa-enabled smart home
devices from unlawful government intrusion.
II.

SOCIETY’S BENEFITS DERIVED FROM THE ALEXA-ENABLED
SMART HOME DEVICE
A.

A New Form of Electronic Surveillance
1.

What is a smart device?

At this rate, any tangible property can become smart by merely
adding sensors, and “a tiny bit of computing capabilities and network
connectivity.” 12 Amazon’s Alexa-enabled home device falls under a
category of smart devices. A smart device is “a context-aware
electronic device capable of performing autonomous computing and
connecting to other devices…wirelessly for data exchange.” 13 Smart
devices possess features of “context-awareness, autonomous
computing, and connectivity.” 14 Context-awareness is “the ability of
a system . . . to gather information about its environment at any given
time and adapt behaviors accordingly.” 15 Autonomous computing is a
device’s ability to “perform[sic] tasks autonomously without the direct
command of the user.” 16 The connectivity feature refers to a smart
device’s ability to connect wirelessly to a data network and cloud
system. 17 The cloud stores data on an offsite location:
[The cloud is an] internet data center where software
and services reside, instead of being stored on local
hardware such as your computer or other electronic
devices. Cloud computing harnesses the power of the
internet to outsource tasks, such as housing software or
file storage. Cloud storage refers to the process of
saving data to an offsite storage system not found on
12 Manuel Silverio, What is a Smart Device?- The Key Concept of the Internet of
Things, MEDIUM (Dec. 29, 2019), https://towardsdatascience.com/what-is-a-smart-devicethe-key-concept-of-the-internet-of-things-52da69f6f91b.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
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your electronic device. This isn’t saving items to a
folder on your desktop or transferring items onto a
thumb drive. Cloud storage systems are maintained by
a third party, and you save your files to a remote
database thanks to the power of the internet. This allows
you to backup and access your files from any device
that is connected to the internet. 18
As an alternative to buying external hard drives, cloud storage is
convenient and cost-effective.
2.

What is a voice recognition device?

Voice recognition is “the technology by which sounds, words
or phrases spoken by humans are converted into electrical signals, and
these signals are transformed into coding patterns to which meaning
has been assigned.” 19 Voice recognition technology created a voice
assistant industry where software developers use artificial intelligence
and machine learning capabilities to improve their voice recognition
devices.
Voice recognition devices have evolved throughout the years
and continue to evolve as devices need updating. 20 In 1961, IBM
introduced the IBM Shoebox as the first digital speech recognition
technology, recognizing 16 words. 21 In 2011, Apple introduced Siri. 22
In 2013, Microsoft introduced Cortana. 23 In 2014, Amazon introduced

What is Cloud Storage and How Does it Work?, CDW (Jan. 8, 2019),
https://www.cdw.com/content/cdw/en/articles/cloud/2019/01/08/what-is-cloudstorage.html?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIw_e78Ht5wIVj5OzCh35dgA0EAAYAiAAEgJMLvD_BwE&cm_ven=acquirgy&cm_cat=google&
cm_pla=SEO+Articles&cm_ite=Cloud+Storage+Definition+E&ef_id=EAIaIQobChMIw_e7
8Ht5wIVj5OzCh35dgA0EAAYAiAAEgJMLvD_BwE:G:s&s_kwcid=AL!4223!3!395466473
699!e!!g!!what%20is%20cloud%20storage&s_kwcid=AL!4223!3!395466473699!e!!g!!wha
t%20is%20cloud%20storage.
19 Jim Baumann, Voice Recognition, HUMAN INTERFACE TECHNOLOGY LABORATORY,
http://www.hitl.washington.edu/projects/knowledge_base/virtualworlds/EVE/I.D.2.d.VoiceRecognition.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2020).
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
18
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Alexa. 24 In 2017, Google launched Google Home with multi-user
support to recognize six different voices. 25
Amazon created Alexa, an artificial intelligence system, to
engage and understand humans. 26 The Alexa-enabled Echo device is
a smart home device that features voice recognition. The ability to
engage and understand humans requires smart devices to learn about
its user’s likes and dislikes, habits, and much more.
3.

The Alexa-enabled Echo device assists law
enforcement

Richard Clarke created the expression “dataveillance to define
the systematic observation, collation, and dissemination that modern
computing make[s] possible.” 27 Smart devices possess an everincreasing capacity to record intimate information by “the combined
impact of an increased ability to collect[,] process[,] and disseminate
information.” 28 By design, smart home devices also gather sensitive
information about their owner and store it in the cloud system.29
Amazon’s Alexa-enabled Echo device continuously records and
collects data about the user’s life to produce efficient and convenient
virtual assistance. 30
The Alexa-enabled Echo device also creates the potential for
law enforcement to obtain this accumulation of information and use it
against the user. For example, a judge in New Hampshire ordered
Amazon to release recordings from an Echo device during a criminal
investigation. 31 Amazon’s Alexa-enabled Echo device activates with
the wake word Alexa when it begins to record and save the data
collected. 32 Considering the smart home device’s capacity to store
incriminating information, gaining access to the data collected
appeared pertinent to the investigation. Prosecutors reasoned that the
24

Id.
Id.
26 George
Anders, ”Alexa, Understand Me”, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 9, 2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608571/alexa-understand-me/.
27 M. Ryan Calo, People Can Be So Fake: A New Dimension to Privacy and Technology
Scholarship, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 809, 822 (2010).
28 Id.
29 The Mystery of the Amazon Echo Data, PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL (Apr. 17, 2019),
https://privacyinternational.org/news-analysis/2819/mystery-amazon-echo-data.
30 Id.
31 Weiss, supra note 2.
32 Id.
25
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Echo device could have activated at the time of the crime. 33 However,
an Amazon spokesperson said, “no information [would] be released
until the company [was] served with a valid legal demand.” 34 This
case demonstrates law enforcement’s growing interest in obtaining the
data collected from the Alexa-enabled smart home device.
Moreover, in a similar case, a prosecutor sought the recordings
from the defendant’s Alexa-enabled Echo smart speaker as evidence
in a criminal investigation. 35 Since Amazon’s Echo device works by
endlessly listening for the wake word Alexa, the device records the
voice of the user even without his knowledge. Hence, the voiceactivated Echo device could potentially provide information about the
incident. 36 Amazon’s lawyers wrote a memo seeking to quash the
prosecutor’s request for a search warrant by arguing that the First
Amendment protected the recorded speech. 37 Subsequently, the
defendant voluntarily gave up the recordings from his Alexa-enabled
smart device, which led Amazon to provide prosecutors with the
recorded data. 38 This scenario demonstrates that when a user of
Amazon’s Alexa-enabled smart home device voluntarily consents to
share the information gathered by the smart device, he waives his
privacy rights.
Recently, Amazon commented on its compliance with the
governmental demands of the Alexa-enabled Echo smart device. 39
Turning over the data to law enforcement depends on whether the
government provides a lawful court order requiring the disclosure. 40
In 2019, police obtained a warrant for the recordings from Alexaenabled Echo devices that were in a house during the time a murder
ensued. 41 In justifying the probable cause standard for the execution
of a warrant, police officers wrote, “[i]t is believed that evidence of
crimes, audio recordings capturing the attack on victim Silvia Crespo
that occurred in the main bedroom … may be found on the server
maintained by or for Amazon.” 42
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Epstein, supra note 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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In reply, an Amazon representative stated, “…the company
does not disclose customer information in response to government
demands unless we’re required to do so to comply with a legally valid
and binding order[;] the company objects to overbroad or otherwise
inappropriate demands as a matter of course.” 43 However, a
spokesman for the Hallandale Beach Police Department later stated,
“we did receive [the Alexa-enabled Echo device] recordings, and we
are in the process of analyzing the information that was sent to us.”44
It appears from this case that Amazon believes in both the spirit of the
Fourth Amendment and its text when asked by the government to
disclose the data collected from Alexa-enabled smart home devices.
A District Court also followed the spirit of the Fourth
Amendment and its text regarding the disclosure of data collected from
Alexa-enabled smart home devices in United States v. Chiu. 45 Chiu,
the defendant, moved to suppress the evidence seized from his
residence, conducted according to a warrant. 46 The evidence seized
included an Alexa-enabled Echo device that officers believed
contained child pornography. 47 The court denied the motion to
suppress the evidence because “the search warrant affidavit provided
probable cause that evidence of a crime, particularly possession or
receipt of child pornography, would be found in Chiu’s residence.” 48
Moreover, the state court considered the officer’s expertise in
knowing the habits of child pornography consumers for the issuance
of a search warrant. 49 Child pornography consumers “maintain their
digital or electronic collections in a safe, secure, and private
environment . . . kept close by . . . to enable the individual to view or
access the material, and to safeguard it.” 50 Considering this
information, the judge denied Chiu’s motion to suppress. 51 This case
shows how some courts apply the Fourth Amendment to protect Alexaenabled smart home devices and the data it stores. Since the Supreme
Court has not decided on Fourth Amendment issues concerning Alexa43

Id.
Id.
45 United States v. Chiu, No. CR 18-10431-DJC, 2019 WL 3755953, at *1 (D. Mass. Aug.
8, 2019).
46 Id.
47 Id. at 2*.
48 Id. at 3*.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 4*.
44
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enabled smart home devices, lower courts create inconsistent results
regarding smart home devices and governmental searches and
seizures.
As provided by law, securing a search warrant requires law
enforcement to obtain a written order signed by a court authorizing the
officer to conduct a search or seizure. Warrants are precise and
authorize law enforcement officers to search in particular locations and
seize specific items. Governmental searches and seizures performed
without a valid warrant are deemed presumptively invalid. 52 Courts
generally suppress evidence obtained from governmental searches and
seizure conducted without a warrant unless a court finds that the search
was reasonable under the circumstances. 53
4.

Electronic devices improve law enforcement
investigations

Consumers’ use of smart home devices leaves behind a digital
footprint that can be utilized in government investigations as police
recognize the value of digital surveillance. 54 In the past, evidence at a
crime scene included blood, fingerprints, footmarks, fabric from a
shirt, and hair. However, technological advancements created virtual
evidence that derives from computers, cell phones, watches, and more.
For instance, law enforcement officials use the data collected from
Fitbits 55 activity trackers to Ring56 doorbells for help in their
52
53

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147-48 (1925).
Id. at 149:
If the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause,
that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to
the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which
by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are
valid. The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was
deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a
manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and
rights of individual citizens.

Id.

Epstein, supra note 4.
Fitbit Privacy Policy, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/us/legal/privacy-policy (Effective
Dec. 18, 2019) (explaining Fitbit’s ability to collect data to estimate a variety of metrics like
the number of steps users take, their distance traveled, calories burned, heart rate, sleep stages,
and location. When a user’s Fitbit syncs with Fitbit’s applications and software, the data
recorded from the user’s Fitbit is transferred to Fitbit’s servers.).
56 Amanda Derrick, What is the Ring Doorbell and How Does it Work?, LIFEWIRE (May 8,
2020), https://www.lifewire.com/how-ring-doorbell-works-4583925 (explaining how Ring
54
55
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investigations. 57 Officers might use a Fitbit to discredit a suspect’s
alibi by using the Fitbit data to show he was out walking instead of
sleeping.
Moreover, Ring openly partnered with police and “allows law
enforcement to access the camera feeds captured and transmitted by
their devices.” 58 The camera footage from Ring doorbells can create a
new kind of neighborhood watch. However, “Ring does not disclose
customer information in response to government demands unless [it is]
required to do so to comply with a legally valid and binding order.”59
Like Amazon, Ring requires law enforcement to obtain a search
warrant based on probable cause to access the footage from its device.
Additionally, law enforcement officers use Live Scan, 60 which
captures fingerprints electronically and checks the marks against a
national database. 61 Live Scan then alerts law enforcement officers to
suspects that have provided false identification information. 62 Live
Scan helps officers collect accurate information about a person’s past
encounter with law enforcement and biographic information.
Law enforcement officers are interested in digital surveillance
because physical location and time, among other information, are
essential in investigating a crime. 63 Smart devices can identify
suspects near a crime scene through geolocation information, which
can result in the discredit of a suspect’s recollection of facts. 64 The use

doorbells detect and capture video of motion, which instantly sends a push notification to the
user’s device and stores the footage in the cloud with a subscription).
57 Epstein, supra note 54.
58 Id.
59 Drew Harwell, Doorbell-camera firm Ring has partnered with 400 police forces,
WASH.
POST (Aug.
28,
2019),
extending
surveillance
concerns,
THE
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/08/28/doorbell-camera-firm-ring-haspartnered-with-police-forces-extending-surveillance-reach/?arc404=true.
60 What is Electronic “Live Scan” Fingerprinting Technology?, ACCURATE BIOMETRICS,
https://accuratebiometrics.com/what-is-livescan (last visited May 23, 2020) (describing Live
Scan as an electronic means of capturing fingerprints in a digitized format, which transmit the
data to a state repository or the FBI to be searched against criminal databases. By processing
fingerprints electronically, a person’s criminal history background can be provided within a
matter of hours.).
61 Julie Mennell & Ian Shaw, Science and Technology at the Crime Scene, MEASUREMENT
CONTROL (Apr. 2005), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/002029400503800301.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Forensic
Analysis
of
Mobile
Malware, SCIENCEDIRECT
https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/computer-science/mobile-device-forensics (last visited
Jan. 1, 2020).
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of technological devices for investigation purposes will continue to
increase as technology becomes more pervasive in society.
Amazon’s most recent information request report, which
covers July 2019 through December 2019, demonstrates that the
company received 1,841 subpoenas and 440 search warrants and
turned over some or all of the information requested. 65 Alex Ferguson
considered the danger of obtaining a user’s Alexa-enabled smart home
devices:
Because Alexa is only supposed to activate and record
when given a specific voice command, it was unclear
whether obtaining a blanket warrant to examine a
device’s transmissions could amount to a “fishing
expedition.” We live in a world where we have these
little digital spies listening to us in our homes, in our
cars, and in our phones. It is going to become pretty
commonplace that law enforcement is going to request
as much digital evidence as they can about us using the
legal means available. We have really created a
privacy-invasive world because of consumer
convenience. 66
Thus, although smart home devices benefit consumers, they may also
be abused by law enforcement.
B.

Amazon’s Alexa Proves Beneficial to Consumers

In-home connectivity has become a significant selling point for
homeowners.
Amazon designed the voice-controlled personal
assistant “Alexa” to serve as the control center to transform homes into
smart homes. The Alexa-enabled smart home device, Echo, is a
speaker powered by cloud-based software that allows users to query
“Alexa” to perform tasks, obtain information, and control other inhome smart devices. Since Alexa is a virtual assistant, just as any
assistant, the information received is recorded. Consequently, Alexaenabled devices record and collect information that viewed together
can reveal an enormous amount of detailed information about the user.
As a virtual assistant, Alexa becomes more efficient when
connected to other smart devices. For example, smart lighting lets
65 AMAZON
INFORMATION
REQUEST
REPORT
https://d1.awsstatic.com/certifications/Information_Request_Report_December_2019.pdf.
66 Epstein, supra note 4.
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users control connected lights by voice when paired with Alexa. 67
Smart plugs also help users turn their everyday appliances into part of
their smart home. 68 By using smart plugs and connecting them with
Alexa, users can “keep track of [their] electricity consumption with an
energy-monitoring smart plug.” 69 Users can also keep an eye on their
homes by connecting smart cameras to Alexa. By pairing these
devices, users can instantly monitor the inside and outside of their
homes from work. 70
Alexa personalizes its contents for each user by recognizing a
user’s unique voice, which allows the device to personalize the content
shown. 71 The smart home device connects users to their personalized
choice of entertainment. For instance, Alexa can individualize a user’s
daily news updates. Users can also create routines using Alexa to
synchronize their habits with Alexa’s actions. 72 A routine is Alexa’s
ability to perform a series of actions with a single command. 73 For
example, a user can say, “Alexa, start my day” so that Alexa responds
by announcing the weather forecast, turning on the kitchen lights, and
reading the news out loud. 74
Alexa, as a virtual assistant, keeps users organized and
prepared for their daily activities. Alexa can access a user’s “calendar
or email from Google, G Suite, iCloud, Outlook.com, or Office 365,” 75
and the user can ask Alexa to add events to his calendar. Without
touching any device, users can go through a day’s worth of emails
Alexa Features: Smart Home, AMAZON,
https://www.amazon.com/b/ref=aeg_lp_sh_d/ref=s9_acss_bw_cg_aegflp_4b1_w?node=179
34679011&pf_rd_m=ATVPDKIKX0DER&pf_rd_s=merchandised-search6&pf_rd_r=YF0Q1SMNDWYXBCKDRQYN&pf_rd_t=101&pf_rd_p=13955371-8a014a1a-8e17-c735780ef269&pf_rd_i=17934672011 (last visited Jan. 2, 2020).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Alexa Features: News & Information, AMAZON,
https://www.amazon.com/b/ref=aeg_lp_ni_d_text/ref=s9_acss_bw_cg_aegflp_md1_w?node
=17934677011&pf_rd_m=ATVPDKIKX0DER&pf_rd_s=merchandised-search6&pf_rd_r=YF0Q1SMNDWYXBCKDRQYN&pf_rd_t=101&pf_rd_p=13955371-8a014a1a-8e17-c735780ef269&pf_rd_i=17934672011 (last visited Jan. 2, 2020).
72 Alexa Features: Smart Home, supra note 67.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Alexa
Features:
Productivity, AMAZON,
https://www.amazon.com/b/ref=aeg_lp_prod_d_text/ref=s9_acss_bw_cg_aegflp_md1_w?no
de=17934678011&pf_rd_m=ATVPDKIKX0DER&pf_rd_s=merchandised-search6&pf_rd_r=YF0Q1SMNDWYXBCKDRQYN&pf_rd_t=101&pf_rd_p=13955371-8a014a1a-8e17-c735780ef269&pf_rd_i=17934672011 (last visited Jan. 2, 2020).
67
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before their coffee is ready because Alexa can even read the user’s
emails out loud. 76 Alexa also tells users the traffic conditions and
informs users about the duration of their commute. 77 Alexa further
enables users to communicate with others outside the home in over 150
countries worldwide. 78
A significant development in the Alexa-enabled smart home
device is its ability to handle and access health information. Amazon
created a way for companies to transmit information like medical
diagnosis and pharmaceutical prescriptions via Alexa while remaining
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
compliant. 79 Amazon invited health care companies to develop voice
programs which Amazon refers to as “skills.” 80 The head of Alexa
Heath and Wellness stated, “[t]hese new skills are designed to help
customers manage a variety of healthcare needs at home [by] simply
using voice . . . whether it’s booking a medical appointment, accessing
hospital post-discharge instructions, checking on the status of a
prescription delivery, and more.” 81
Recently, the Mayo Clinic launched a new “skill” for Alexaenabled smart home devices to conveniently inform users of newly
developed information about the COVID-19 pandemic. 82 When users
enable the Mayo Clinic Answers on the COVID-19 skill, they can
receive information from the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention and Mayo Clinic experts. 83 A Mayo Clinic physician stated
the new skill “offers the latest information on symptoms, prevention
[,]and how to cope in a hands-free way using only the voice – a fact
that is especially important when we’re trying to reduce the spread of
76

Id.
Alexa Features: News & Information, supra note 71.
78 Alexa
Features:
Communication, AMAZON,
https://www.amazon.com/b/ref=aeg_flp_ent_text/ref=s9_acss_bw_cg_aegflp_md1_w?node
=17934681011&pf_rd_m=ATVPDKIKX0DER&pf_rd_s=merchandised-search6&pf_rd_r=YF0Q1SMNDWYXBCKDRQYN&pf_rd_t=101&pf_rd_p=13955371-8a014a1a-8e17-c735780ef269&pf_rd_i=17934672011 (last visited Jan. 2, 2020).
79 Angela Chen, Amazon’s Alexa Now Handles Patient Health Information, THE VERGE,
(Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/4/18295260/amazon-hipaa-alexa-echopatient-health-information-privacy-voice-assistant.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Coronavirus Updates: Mayo Clinic Launches New Covid-19 Information Skill For
MINNESOTA,
(Apr.
27,
2020),
Amazon’s
Alexa,
CBS
https://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2020/04/27/coronavirus-updates-mayo-clinic-launches-newcovid-19-information-skill-for-amazons-alexa/.
83 Id.
77
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the virus transmitted by physical contact.” 84 Consequently, Alexaenabled devices record and collect information that viewed together
can reveal an enormous amount of detailed information about the user.
III.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ELECTRONIC DEVICES

The Supreme Court regularly addresses advances in modern
technology and, when necessary, enlarges the Fourth Amendment’s
protection. 85 The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable
searches and seizures to prevent officials from arbitrary and oppressive
interference with an individual’s privacy. 86 Search and seizure are
essential terms of art in the Fourth Amendment because they are
threshold elements to determine whether law enforcement’s action
constitutes a violation of the law. According to previous Supreme
Court case law, the location and classification of an electronic device
are fundamental in determining whether law enforcement committed a
Fourth Amendment search. 87 For many years, courts have adjudicated
matters about data stored on electronic devices. 88 However, the Court
has not addressed data collected and recorded by Alexa-enabled smart
home devices.
A.

1928: Wiretap

Olmstead v. United States 89 concerned the applicability of the
Fourth Amendment to warrantless wiretapping by government agents.
84

Id.
See Marjorie A. Shields, Fourth Amendment Protections, and Equivalent State
Constitutional Protections, as Applied to the Use of GPS Technology, Transponder, or the
Like, to Monitor Location and Movement of Motor Vehicle, Aircraft, or Watercraft, 5 A.L.R.
6th 385 (Originally published in 2005).
86 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976).
87 See James J. Tomkovicz, Technology and the Threshold of the Fourth Amendment: A
Tale of Two Futures, 72 MISS. L.J. 317 (2002).
88 See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 378-79 (2014) (smartphones); United States
v. Warchak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (email); United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990,
994 (9th Cir. 2006) (laptop); United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir. 1999)
(computer); United States v. Barth. 26 F. Supp. 2d 929, 936 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (holding that
the “Fourth Amendment protection of closed computer files and hard drives is similar to the
protection it affords a person’s closed containers and closed personal effects.”); See generally
Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531,542 (2005)
(noting that computers store “a tremendous amount of information that most users do not know
about and cannot control.”).
89 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
85
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Here, federal officers used wiretaps to intercept Olmstead’s telephone
conversations. 90 The Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment
protects houses and offices from which the conversations arose against
unreasonable searches and seizures, but only from physical
trespasses. 91 The Court determined that officers secured the evidence
solely by using their sense of hearing. 92 The Court did not consider
wiretaps, used to listen to Olmstead’s conversations, as a physical
trespass because officers installed the wiretaps on telephone lines
outside Olmstead’s property. 93 The Court stated, “the intervening
wires are not part of [the defendant’s] house [or] office any more than
are the highways along which they are stretched.” 94 Looking inside a
house from across the street with one’s eyes through binoculars or
using one’s ears to listen to conversations inside a house was not
classified as a physical trespass onto a person’s home, a
constitutionally protected area.
Furthermore, the Court viewed conversations as intangible and
not constitutionally protected. 95 Finding that speech was not classified
property within the Fourth Amendment’s context, the Court
determined that wiretapping did not constitute a search or seizure to
trigger the Fourth Amendment’s protection. 96 The Court’s decision
demonstrated that the Fourth Amendment’s application depended on
whether law enforcement trespassed on a suspect’s constitutionally
protected property. Since the Court decided that conversations and
telephone line wires on a public street were not constitutionally
protected property or areas under the Fourth Amendment, there was no
constitutional violation.
B.

1961: Spike Mike

Silverman v. United States 97 concerned the applicability of the
Fourth Amendment to warrantless use of a spike mike by government
agents. A spike mike “was a microphone with a spike about a foot
long attached to it together with an amplifier, a power pack, and
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Id. at 456-57.
Id. at 466.
Id. at 457.
Id. at 466.
Id. at 465.
Id.
Id. at 466.
See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
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earphones.” 98 In this case, officers pushed a spike mike through a
neighboring house until it touched the heating ducts occupied by the
defendant’s house. 99 The officers then heard the defendant’s
conversations from the second and first floors through the spike mike
earphones. 100
In determining whether law enforcement violated the
defendant’s Fourth Amendment right, the Court moved away from its
decision in Olmstead 101 and decided that it was unnecessary to show
an actual governmental trespass. 102 The Court did not need to examine
whether there was a taking of physical property. 103 The Court stressed
that “inherent Fourth Amendment rights are not inevitably measurable
in terms of ancient niceties of tort or real property law.” 104 The Court
instead relied on the personal rights that the Fourth Amendment
secures. 105 At the very core of the Fourth Amendment stands the “right
of a man to retreat into his own home, and there be free from
unreasonable government intrusion.” 106 The Court indicated it has
“never held that a federal officer may without [a] warrant and without
consent physically entrench into a man’s office or home, there secretly
observe or listen, and relate at the man’s subsequent criminal trial what
was seen and heard.” 107 The Court held the actual intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area, the defendant’s home, was effected
without the owner’s knowledge or consent. 108 Consequently, there was
no need to determine whether a technical trespass under property law
occurred relating to the defendant’s wall. 109 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court was preparing to look beyond the property right, trespass
analysis applied in Olmstead. 110

98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

Id. at 506.
Id. at 506-07.
Id.
See Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Silverman, 365 U.S. at 510.
Id. at 511.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 512.
Id.
Id. at 511.
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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1967: Electronic Listening and Recording Devices

In 1967, the Supreme Court decided a landmark decision
regarding the Fourth Amendment and rejected the trespass on property
analysis from Olmstead. 111 In Katz v. United States, the Court further
elaborated on the protection of personal rights from Silverman 112 by
establishing the “reasonable expectation of privacy” 113 doctrine.
Katz 114 concerned the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to the
government’s warrantless use of an electronic listening and recording
device attached to a public telephone booth. 115
The Court asserted that the Fourth Amendment “protects
individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion.”116
More importantly, the “Fourth Amendment protects people[,] not
places.” 117 The Court considered the advancements of technology and
decided that the trespass doctrine constituted “bad physics as well as
bad law.” 118 The Court determined that “what a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not subject to
the Fourth Amendment[‘s] protection. But what he seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.” 119
In this case, although people could see Katz in the glass
fashioned telephone booth, they could not hear his conversations. The
Court further stated, “[w]herever a man may be, he is entitled to know
that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”120
The government agents ignored the Fourth Amendment’s requirement
of obtaining a search warrant based on probable cause. The Court
reasoned that a warrant is “a constitutional precondition of the kind of
electronic surveillance involved in this case.” 121
Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion determined that the
protection derived from the Fourth Amendment depends on a person’s
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

Id.
See Silverman, 365 U.S. at 505.
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id.
Id. at 349-50.
Id.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 351. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 359.
Id.
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reasonable expectation of privacy. 122 Justice Harlan stated that a
person’s home is “a place where he expects privacy, but objects,
activities or statements that he exposes to the plain view of outsiders
are not protected because no intention to keep them to himself has been
exhibited.” 123 Similarly, “conversations in the open would not be
protected against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under
the circumstances would be unreasonable.” 124
In this case, Justice Harlan reasoned that when Katz shut the
door of the booth and paid to make his phone call, he was entitled to
assume that his conversations were private. 125 Justice Harlan viewed
the telephone booth as “a temporarily private place whose momentary
occupants’ expectations of freedom from [government] intrusion[s]
are recognized as reasonable.” 126 Thus, surveillance of a person’s
conversations in a public telephone booth was unreasonable, absent a
search warrant.
D.

2001: Thermal Imaging Device

Kyllo v. United States 127 concerned the applicability of the
Fourth Amendment to the government’s warrantless use of a senseenhancing device aimed at a private home from a public street. 128 In
this case, agents suspected Kyllo of growing marijuana in his home,
which required high-intensity lamps. 129 Agents used an Agema
Thermovision 210 130 thermal imager device to scan Kyllo’s home to
detect infrared radiation that was invisible to the naked eye. 131 The
thermal imager device operated like a “video camera showing heat
images.” 132 Kyllo’s home scan took only a few minutes, and the agent
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. (Harlan, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
124 Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
125 Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
126 Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
127 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
128 Id. at 29.
129 Id.
130 Id. (describing the Agema Thermovision 210 as a thermal imager, which detects infrared
radiation which generally all objects emit but is not visible to the naked eye. The thermal
imager converts the infrared radiation into images based on relative warmth. Black signifies
that the area is cool, white shows the area is hot. Shades of gray suggest relative temperature
differences. The thermal imager operates like a video camera showing heat images.).
131 Id.
132 Id. at 30.
122
123
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obtained this data sitting across the street from the front of Kyllo’s
house. 133 The scan showed that the roof over the garage and a sidewall
of Kyllo’s home were relatively hot compared to the rest of the home
and substantially warmer than neighboring homes. 134
The Court stated, “[a]t the very core of the Fourth Amendment
stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free
from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” 135 The Court understood
the concern over technological advancements and its impact on
privacy rights by saying, “the rule we adopt must take account of more
sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.”136
The Court stated, “all details [from houses] are intimate details,
because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.”137
The agent obtained details of how warm Kyllo heated his home, and
the details were intimate because it was data collected from the
home. 138 The Court stated, “[w]hile it is certainly possible to conclude
from the videotape of the thermal imaging [device] that…no
significant compromise of the homeowner’s privacy [occurred], we
must take the long view, from the original meaning of the Fourth
Amendment forward.” 139 Thus, the government’s surveillance by a
thermal-image device, which collected details of the home that were
not visible without entering the home, was a search and was
unreasonable without a warrant. 140
E.

2012: GPS

United States v. Jones 141 concerned the applicability of the
Fourth Amendment to the government’s use of a GPS tracking device
without a valid warrant. 142 In Jones, government officials acquired a
warrant to expire in ten days that authorized installing a GPS device
on the car registered to Jone’s wife in the District of Columbia. 143 On
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

Id.
Id.
Id. at 31 (internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id. at 36.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 40.
Id.
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
Id.
Id. at 402-03.
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the eleventh day, government officials installed the GPS tracking
device on the car’s undercarriage in Maryland without a valid, legally
binding warrant. 144 Over the next twenty-eight days, government
officials used the device to track the car’s movements. 145 Officials also
replaced the GPS’s battery located on the car. 146
The Court recognized that “[b]y means of signals from multiple
satellites, the device established the vehicle’s location within 50 to 100
feet, and communicated that location by cellular phone to a
Government computer. It relayed more than 2,000 pages of data over
the 4-week period.” 147 The Court stated, “[i]t is beyond dispute that a
vehicle is an “effect” as that term is used in the Amendment.” 148 Here,
law enforcement physically occupied private property and obtained
incriminating information. 149 Thus, the government’s installation of
the GPS device on the car to monitor its movements constituted a
search under the Fourth Amendment. 150
In reaching its decision, the Court considered the framers’
intent in drafting the Constitution. The Court stated, “[t]he text of the
Fourth Amendment reflects its close connection to property, since
otherwise[,] it would have referred simply to the right of the people to
be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 151 The Court
reasoned that Jones possessed the car, “at the time the Government
trespassorily inserted the information gathering [GPS] device.”152
Here, the Court focused on the prior property-based trespassory
analysis of the Fourth Amendment. However, the Court did state, “we
do not make trespass the exclusive test. Situations involving merely
the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain
subject to the [reasonable expectation of privacy] analysis.” 153
Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion emphasized that the
Fourth Amendment did not only apply to government trespassory
intrusions on private property. 154 The reasonable expectation of
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

Id. at 403.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 404.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 405 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 410.
Id. at 411.
Id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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privacy analysis “augmented, but did not displace or diminish, the
common-law trespassory test that preceded it.” 155 Justice Sotomayor
stated, “longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses
impinges on expectations of privacy.” 156 Considering that “GPS
monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s
public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial,
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations[,]” 157 it is
clear that officers need warrants to obtain this data. Furthermore, GPS
monitoring is “cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance
techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the
ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices.” 158
More importantly, Justice Sotomayor thought it might “be
necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed
to third parties.” 159 Justice Sotomayor believed the third party doctrine
was “ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying
out mundane tasks.” 160 Justice Sotomayor determined that consumers
of electronic devices “can attain constitutionally protected status only
if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a
prerequisite for privacy.” 161 She further stated, “I would not assume
that all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public
for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth
Amendment protection.” 162 Justice Sotomayor acknowledged the
growing concern that people who use electronic devices might be left
unprotected under the law.
F.

2014: Cell Phone

Riley v. California163 concerned the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment to the government’s search of cell phones without a
warrant. In Riley, an officer confiscated Riley’s “smart phone, a cell
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. at 415-16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. at 418 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
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phone with a broad range of other functions based on advanced
computing capability, large storage capacity[,] and Internet
connectivity.” 164 Without a warrant, the officer searched the cell
phone. 165
Here, the Court considered that “cell phones differ in both a
quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be
kept on an arrestee’s person.” 166 Cell phones are “minicomputers that
also happen to have the capacity to be used as a telephone.” 167 The
Court acknowledged that a distinguishable feature of modern cell
phones is their immense storage capacity. 168 Before cell phones, a
search of a person resulted in gathering limited information that
“constituted only a narrow intrusion on privacy.” 169 However,
technology advanced to the degree where law enforcement can obtain
detailed information about the owner of the cell phone:
Most people cannot lug around every piece of mail they
have received for the past several months, every picture
they have taken, or every book or article they have
read–nor would they have any reason to attempt to do
so. And if they did, they would have to drag behind
them a trunk of the sort held to require a search
warrant…rather than a container the size of the
cigarette package. 170
Therefore, the investigations of cell phones reveal more detailed
information about an arrestee then ever before.
The Court determined that law enforcement’s intrusion into
privacy is no longer physically limited due to cell phones. For
example, cell phone technology translates millions of “pages of text,
thousands of pictures, or hundreds of videos.” 171 Also, “even the most
basic phones that sell for less than $20 might hold photographs, picture
messages, text messages, Internet browsing history, a calendar, a
thousand-entry phone book, and so on.” 172 The Court noted, it is no
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172

Id. at 379.
Id.
Id. at 393.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 393-94.
Id. at 394.
Id.
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exaggeration to say that about “90% of American adults who own a
cell phone keep on their person a digital record of nearly every aspect
of their lives–from the mundane to the intimate.” 173
Obtaining cell phone data differs from physical evidence not
only in quantity but also in quality. “An Internet search and browsing
history, for example, can be found on an Internet-enabled phone and
[can] reveal an individual’s private interest or concerns–perhaps a
search for certain symptoms of [a] disease, coupled with frequent visits
to WebMD [will show a user’s worry over an illness.]” 174 The Court
also considered users’ ability to download other applications onto their
phones:
Mobile application software on a cell phone, or “apps,”
offer a range of tools for managing detailed information
about all aspects of a person’s life. There are apps for
Democratic Party news and Republican Party news;
apps for alcohol, drug, and gambling addictions; apps
for sharing prayer requests; apps for tracking pregnancy
symptoms; apps for planning your budget; apps for
every conceivable hobby or pastime; apps for
improving your romantic life. There are popular apps
for buying or selling just about anything, and the
records of such transactions may be accessible on the
phone indefinitely. There are over a million apps
available in each of the two major app stores; the phrase
“there’s an app for that” is now part of the popular
lexicon. The average smart phone user has installed 33
apps, which together can form a revealing montage of
the user’s life. 175
A single cell phone could give officials access to information that
would generally require long hours of surveillance and, even then,
would not result in readily available information as a cell phone.
Moreover, the data users view on their cell phones may not be
stored on the device:
[C]ell phones [are] used to access data located
elsewhere, at the tap of a screen. That is what cell
173
174
175

Id. at 395.
Id. at 395-96.
Id. at 396.
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phones, with increasing frequency, are designed to do
by taking advantage of ‘cloud computing.’ Cloud
computing is the capacity of Internet-connected devices
to display data stored on remote servers rather than on
the device itself. Cell phone users often may not know
whether particular information is stored on the device
or in the cloud, and it generally makes little difference.
Moreover, the same type of data may be stored locally
on the device for one user and in the cloud for
another. 176
A cell phone could equip officers with information recorded at the time
of the arrest, and information that was recorded several months or
years ago because of cloud storage.
The Court determined it was reasonable to expect that
“incriminating information will be found on a phone regardless of
when the crime occurred.” 177 The Court stated that “even an individual
pulled over for something as basic as speeding might well have
locational data dispositive of guilt on his phone.” 178 Likewise, “an
individual pulled over for reckless driving might have evidence on the
phone that shows whether he was texting while driving.” 179
The Court stated, “modern cell phones are not just another
technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may
reveal, they hold for many Americans the privacies of life.” 180 The
Court held, “the fact that technology now allows an individual to carry
such information in his hand does not make the information any less
worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought.” 181 Thus, the
Court concluded that cell phones are distinct from other physical
material, resulting in a warrant requirement. 182 The Court’s holding
“is not that the information on a cell phone is immune from search; it
is instead that a warrant is generally required before such a search.”183

176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183

Id. at 397 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 399.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 403 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 381.
Id. at 401.
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2018: Cell Site Location

Carpenter v. United States 184 concerned the applicability of the
Fourth Amendment to the government’s seizure and search of cell site
location information from cell phone companies. 185 In Carpenter,
officers obtained “12,898 location points cataloging Carpenter’s
movements–an average of 101 data points per day” 186 from cell phone
companies. Cell site location information (CSLI) is the time-stamped
record that a phone produces when it connects to a cell site, 187 radio
antennas. 188 The Court noted that “most modern devices, such as
smartphones, tap into the wireless network several times a minute
whenever their signal is on, even [when] the owner is not using one of
the phone’s features.” 189
In determining whether the Fourth Amendment applied, the
Court reviewed past cases dealing with technological advancements.
The Court stated, “the Amendment seeks to secure the privacies of life
against arbitrary power.” 190 Also, a “central aim of the Framers was to
place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance.”191
However, this case was different from previously decided cases as
third party cell phone companies maintained the CSLI, which did not
fit neatly under existing precedent. 192
The Court analyzed whether the third party doctrine applied to
CSLI, which would allow law enforcement to obtain CSLI without a
warrant. In past cases, the Court distinguished the application for the
Fourth Amendment between information that people kept private and
information shared with others. The third party doctrine determines
that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information
he voluntarily turns over to third parties.” 193 The law applies, “even if
the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only
for a limited purpose.” 194
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194

See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
Id.
Id. at 2212.
Id. at 2211.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2214 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2216 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979)).
Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)).
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The third party doctrine originated from United States v.
Miller, 195 where Miller could “assert neither ownership nor
possession” 196 of his bank statements since the Court determined the
documents were part of the bank’s business records. In Miller, the
checks and bank statements were “not confidential communications
but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions.”197
This further showed that Miller had a limited expectation of privacy in
those documents. Furthermore, Miller exposed the bank statement’s
information to bank employees in the “ordinary course of business.”198
Thus, the Fourth Amendment did not protect Miller’s bank
statements. 199
Additionally, the Court applied the third party doctrine in the
context of information conveyed to a telephone company. 200 In Smith
v. Maryland, 201 the Court ruled that government officials’ use of a pen
register, a device that recorded the outgoing phone numbers dialed on
a landline telephone, was not a search. 202 Since a pen register had
limited capabilities in its use, the Court “doubt[ed] that people[,] in
general[,] entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers
they dial.” 203 Also, telephone subscribers knew that telephone
companies used numbers dialed for a variety of legitimate business
purposes, including routing calls. 204 Thus, when Smith placed a call,
he “voluntarily conveyed the dialed numbers to the phone company by
exposing that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of
business.” 205 Thus, the Fourth Amendment did not protect the
numbers Smith dialed. 206
However, in Carpenter’s case, the Court faced a new
phenomenon that did not fit with past decisions: the ability to chronicle
a person’s past movements through the record of his cell phone signals.

195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206

See Miller, 425 U.S. at 435.
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216 (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 440).
Id. (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 440).
Id. (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 442).
Id. (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 443).
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
Id.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216 (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 742).
Id. (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 742).
Id. (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 743) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 744) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 745).
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CSLI is “detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled.” 207 Since
users share this information with their telephone companies, the third
party doctrine applies. However, the Court expressly declined to apply
the third party doctrine to cover this new circumstance. 208
Given the unique nature of cell phone location records, the fact
that a third party holds this information does not overcome the user’s
claim to Fourth Amendment protection. 209 The Court reasoned that
“although [CSLI] records are generated for commercial purposes, that
distinction does not negate Carpenter’s anticipation of privacy in his
physical location.” 210 The Court stated, “mapping a cell phone’s
location [for] 127 days provides an all-encompassing record of the
holder’s whereabouts.” 211
In distinguishing GPS tracking with CSLI, the Court stated, “a
cell phone faithfully follows its owner beyond public thoroughfares
and into private residences, doctor’s offices, political headquarters,
and other potentially revealing locales.” 212 More importantly, the
Court noted that wireless carriers maintain phone records for up to five
years. 213 The continuously logged CSLI affects all cell phone users,
not just people under investigation. 214
The Court determined that the current third party doctrine did
not apply to CSLI. The Court stated, “there is a world of difference
between the limited types of personal information addressed in Smith
and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of location information
casually collected by wireless carriers today.” 215 For example, phone
companies are not typical witnesses, unlike a “nosy neighbor.”216
Hence, granting law enforcement access to CSLI without a warrant
would grant a “significant extension of [the third party doctrine] to a
distinct category of information.” 217
Likewise, users did not voluntarily share their CSLI with their
wireless providers. The Court stated, “a cell phone logs a cell-site
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217

Id.
Id. at 2217.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2218.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2219.
Id.
Id.
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record by dint of its operation, without an affirmative act on the part of
the user beyond powering up.” 218 The CSLI was generated by virtually
any activity conducted on the phone. The Court noted that “apart from
disconnecting the phone from the network, there is no way to avoid
leaving behind a trail of location data.” 219 The Court determined that
“in no meaningful sense does the user voluntarily assume the risk of
turning over a comprehensive dossier of his physical movements.” 220
The Court held that “an individual maintains a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements as
captured through CSLI.” 221 Thus, where a suspect has a legitimate
privacy interest in records held by a third party, like CSLI, the
government needs a warrant. 222 However, in this case, the Court did
not decide on the issue of “real-time CSLI or ‘tower dumps’ (a
download of information on all the devices connected to a particular
cell site during a particular interval).” 223
IV.

WAYS TO MOVE FORWARD: ALEXA-ENABLED SMART
HOME DEVICES PROTECTED UNDER CURRENT FEDERAL
LAW
A.

The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Doctrine
Applied to Alexa-Enabled Smart Home Devices

According to Katz, 224 the Fourth Amendment applies when a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place or item
searched or seized. 225 Arguably, people hold a reasonable expectation
of privacy in their Alexa-enabled smart home devices because of the
quality and quantity of information the device records and stores. Not
only does the Alexa-enabled smart home device function as a
telephone, but it also functions as a virtual assistant controlling other
smart home devices and keeping the user organized.
However, the Court previously determined that “what a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225

Id. at 2220.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2217.
Id.
Id. at 2220.
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 351.
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not subject to the Fourth Amendment protection.” 226 Similarly, “what
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected.” 227 Users of Alexa-enabled smart
home devices run the risk that Alexa is accidentally recording their
conversation since Alexa is continuously listening for its wake word.
What a user seeks to preserve as private might involuntarily be exposed
to the public. For example, if, in the privacy of their bedroom, a couple
starts to argue and Alexa starts recording without the couple’s
knowledge, then arguably, the couple has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the communications recorded by Alexa.
The government might argue that users of smart home devices
do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the device or its
recordings because they share the information with Amazon.
However, the couple did not knowingly expose their argument to the
public since they did not call on Alexa for assistance. Moreover, the
couple chose to argue in the privacy of their bedroom where no one
can see or hear them. The couple can claim that they had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their Alexa-enabled smart home device and
its recordings because it accidentally recorded information about the
owners.
The couple would also be entitled to claim that they never
intended their intimate conversations to be accessed so easily by the
government. The Supreme Court has always held that a person’s home
is a place where he expects privacy. 228 When the couple shut the front
door of their home, they held a reasonable expectation of privacy and
expected to be free from unlawful government intrusion.
The Supreme Court has already found that collecting intimate
details from within a home is a search and unreasonable. 229 The data
collected from Alexa-enabled smart home devices reveal specific
details of the home where one holds a reasonable expectation of
privacy. For example, when a user sets a routine on Alexa to drop the
heating temperature and gradually turn on the lights, Alexa is
recording the requests. This information not only shows the electricity
usage and heating consumption in the home but also reveals the home
owner’s preferences.

226
227
228
229

Id.
Id.
Id. at 361.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
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Government officials’ access to Alexa’s recorded transcripts
would disclose information that would be impossible to see without
entering the user’s home. As in Kyllo, 230 the law holds that law
enforcement’s obtaining such intimate details of a home is a search
that requires a warrant. 231 Since the Court held that detailed
information collected about actions from within a home requires a
warrant, 232 the government should also obtain a warrant to search or
seize Alexa-enabled smart home devices. Amazon created Alexaenabled smart home devices for home use, and these devices record
information about the user in his home. The home is a constitutionally
protected area where people have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Thus, people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their Alexaenabled smart home devices and their recordings.
B.

The Property-Based Trespassory Analysis Applied
to Alexa-Enabled Smart Home Devices

The Fourth Amendment can also protect Alexa-enabled smart
home devices through the property based trespassory analysis of the
Fourth Amendment. The Court previously held that a physical trespass
by law enforcement constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure. 233
As to the car in Jones, 234 a user’s Alexa-enabled smart home device is
personal property that should also fall under the category of effects
listed in the amendment. 235 For example, if law enforcement were to
grab a home owner’s Alexa-enabled smart home device, this would
constitute a trespass onto the user’s personal property. A search
warrant is required by law enforcement to search and seize a user’s
Alexa enabled smart device as in Jones, 236 where law enforcement
physically occupied private property and obtained incriminating
information. 237
Moreover, the Court explicitly left the door open for Alexaenabled smart devices, whose data transmission does not necessarily
require physical trespass, for the reasonable expectation of privacy
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237

Id. at at 27.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 38.
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 410 (2012).
Id.
Id. at 404.
Id.
Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020

31

Touro Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 2 [2020], Art. 12

694

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36

analysis. 238 Like GPS devices, Alexa-enabled smart home devices can
reveal a user’s daily route to work by reviewing the transcript, which
would show how many times the user asked Alexa to check the fastest
way to travel to work.
Like GPS devices, Alexa can record the user’s movements, but
in a different context. Instead of showing a user’s location through
signals from multiple satellites, Alexa’s recording history can show the
user’s past movements through the aggregate collection and analysis
of Alexa’s recording transcripts. For example, the transcript created
by Alexa’s continuous recording would show that the user frequently
visited the doctor’s office by reading the transcript where the user
asked Alexa to schedule weekly appointments in the online calendar.
Nevertheless, law enforcement’s search of the user’s personal
property, the Alexa-enabled smart home device, is a physical trespass
under the Fourth Amendment that requires a search warrant.
C.

Alexa-Enabled Smart Home Devices Should be
Treated as Cell Phones

Under Riley, 239 the Fourth Amendment applies to the search
and seizure of a smartphone with similar abilities to Alexa-enabled
smart home devices. 240 In Riley, the Court held that law enforcement’s
intrusion of privacy is no longer physically limited due to cell
phones. 241 Before smartphones and Alexa-enabled smart devices, law
enforcement could only obtain limited data about an individual, let
alone information from within his home. Like the smartphone in Riley,
Alexa-enabled smart home devices have massive storage capacity.
Today, when officers obtain Alexa-enabled smart home
devices, they see all the tasks and questions posed by the user to Alexa.
As with smartphones, officers can obtain detailed information about
users from their smart home devices. For example, the recordings by
Alexa produce transcripts that enable law enforcement to see or hear
the conversations made during the time that a crime ensued. If the user
asks Alexa to search for the nearest firearms and gun store on the day
before committing murder, that information might show that he had
the prerequisite intent to cause the death of another person. This
238
239
240
241

Id. at 411.
See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
Id. at 401.
Id. at 394.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol36/iss2/12

32

Sanchez: A New Era: Digital Curtilage

2020

A NEW ERA: DIGITAL CURTILAGE

695

scenario is similar to how a cell phone might show law enforcement
that the user was driving recklessly because, at the time of the accident,
his cell phone shows he was streaming a live video on social media.
Depending on what law enforcement finds on a smart home device
may lead to a criminal conviction.
Furthermore, like smartphones, the data from Alexa-enabled
smart home devices differ from physical evidence in quantity and
quality. Alexa connects users to the internet and other smart devices
and records these actions. An internet search and browsing history can
reveal the user’s private interest or concerns. Alexa-enabled smart
home devices hold many people’s private information about their lives,
just like smartphones. As the Court stated, “the fact that technology
now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does
not make the information any less worthy of the protection for which
the Founders fought.” 242 Even though people do not usually carry
around the Alexa-enabled Echo device, it still stores and collects a
large scale of personal information that warrants protection under the
Fourth Amendment.
D.

The Third Party Doctrine and Alexa-Enabled
Smart Home Devices

The third party doctrine should not apply to prohibit people
from claiming Fourth Amendment protection over their smart home
devices. The third party doctrine states that “a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third
parties.” 243 The law applies “even if the information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose.”244
Whenever a user makes a voice request, the Alexa-enabled smart home
device records the user’s speech and stores the data on Amazon’s
servers, or cloud system, thus possibly implicating the third party
doctrine. However, as in Carpenter, 245 where the third party doctrine
did not apply to the government’s seizure and search of CSLI from
wireless carriers, the Court should rule similarly with Alexa-enabled
smart home devices
Id. at 403.
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018) (quoting Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979)).
244 Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)).
245 Id. at 2206.
242
243
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In order to function at its highest capacity, Alexa-enabled smart
home devices need to connect wirelessly to other data networks and
the cloud system. Amazon’s Alexa-enabled Echo device activates
with the wake word “Alexa” 246 and immediately connects to servers or
other smart devices to fulfill the user’s request. The user’s voice is
recognized by Alexa, 247 which allows the device to access content on
the internet, specifically for the user. The data recorded is stored
unless the user deletes it. To illustrate, users of Amazon’s Echo device
can manage and delete their audio recording transcripts through the
Alexa App or by asking Alexa to delete the recordings. 248
Alexa-enabled smart home devices should overcome the
implementation of the third party doctrine and the doctrine’s result
because sharing information with a third party does not by itself bar it
from Fourth Amendment protections. As CSLI in Carpenter, the data
collected and recorded by Alexa is detailed and automatically
compiled. Like CSLI, Alexa-enabled smart home devices share
information with a third party, Amazon’s employees, to improve the
device and delivery system. The Court in Carpenter stated, “although
[CSLI] records are generated for commercial purposes, that distinction
does not negate Carpenter’s anticipation of privacy in his physical
location.” 249 A stack of Alexa’s recorded transcripts can reveal a
user’s past physical movements and potential future appointments.
Arguably, the third party doctrine should not apply towards
data collected from Alexa-enabled smart devices. Since Alexa can tell
users the traffic conditions and inform users about the duration of their
commute, 250 a print-out of these requests would show the user’s
location at a specific time. For example, a month’s worth of transcripts
containing the interactions between the user and Alexa reveals a
detailed record of the user’s whereabouts. CSLI can reveal when a
person visited the doctor’s office. However, Alexa-enabled smart
home devices can show the same information through recordings and
transcripts and detail the purpose of the visit.

Weiss, supra note 2.
Alexa Features: News & Information, supra note 71.
248 Katie Conner, Here are the Best Tips for Keeping your Information Private While Using
Alexa, CNET https://www.cnet.com/how-to/have-amazon-echo-privacy-fears-heres-whatyou-can-do/ (Oct. 24, 2019).
249 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
250 Alexa Features: News & Information, supra note 71.
246
247
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More importantly, like CSLI, Alexa’s constant listening ability
affects all users, not just those under an investigation. As CSLI
collects unlimited personal information about the user’s physical
movements, Alexa-enabled devices collect significantly more detailed
information. Arguably, just as the wireless carriers in Carpenter were
not typical witnesses, Amazon itself should not be considered a typical
witness.
On the other hand, the government could argue that the third
party doctrine should apply to data collected from Alexa-enabled smart
devices because people voluntarily share their recorded information
with Amazon. Alexa-enabled devices upload the recordings to
Amazon’s servers, and they are used to conduct improvements on the
devices. Similarly, cell phones log CSLI, which are collected and
maintained by wireless providers. Regarding CSLI, the sharing of cell
phone data with wireless providers is not enough to bar the Fourth
Amendment’s protection.
A person’s mere usage creates CSLI without taking any
affirmative action to authorize such data collection except for
powering up the device. 251 Similarly, Alexa records a person’s
conversations without the need for users to hit a record button
physically. Like cell phones, apart from shutting off the Alexa-enabled
device, there is no way to avoid Alexa’s recording of the user’s speech.
The Court determined in Carpenter that “in no meaningful
sense does the user voluntarily assume the risk of turning over a
comprehensive dossier of his physical movements.” 252 Contrary to
what the government might argue, users of Alexa-enabled smart home
devices do not voluntarily disclose the complete documentation of all
encounters and conversations in their homes through the use of Alexa.
Arguably, a warrant should be required when users have a legitimate
privacy interest in records held by a third party like Amazon.
V.

REDEFINING THE TERM “EFFECTS” TO INCLUDE ALEXAENABLED SMART HOME DEVICES

reads:

251
252

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularity
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized. 253
This Note began by acknowledging that the framers of the
United States Constitution did not have a reason to develop law
concerning the government’s use of smart technology to acquire, store,
and analyze personal information about Americans. 254 When the
founding fathers drafted and ratified the Constitution, there were no
electronic devices such as satellites, cell sites, GPS, cell phones, or
other smart devices. For these reasons, Andrew Guthrie Ferguson 255
explored how the “Fourth Amendment built on old-fashioned ‘effects’
can address a new world in which things are no longer just inactive,
static objects, but objects that create and communicate data with other
things.” 256 Ferguson concluded that “unless our constitutional
understanding of an effect adapts to meet modern technology, smart
objects will be open to warrantless searches without sufficient Fourth
Amendment protection.” 257
Ferguson argued that the term effects under the Fourth
Amendment should include smart objects and the related data that the
object transmits into the “Internet of Things.” 258 Thus, effects should
encompass the smart device’s “functionality[,] including its necessary
communication with other devices and stored data.” 259 Thus,
according to Ferguson, an effect would consist of the physical object,
smart data, and communicating signals emanating from the device. 260

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Jones, supra note 5.
255 Professor of Law, David A. Clarke School of Law at the University of the District of
Columbia.
256 Ferguson, supra note 11, at 808.
257 Id.
258 Id. at 813 (introducing Technologist Kevin Ashton as the person who coined the term
‘the Internet of Things’ in 1998. Kevin Ashton stated, “adding radio-frequency identification
and sensors to everyday objects will create an Internet of Things, and lay the foundations of a
new age of machine perception.”). Id.
259 Id. at 809.
260 Id.
253
254
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Under Ferguson’s definition of effects, sensory-embedded
license plates would be afforded constitutional protection from the
term effects. 261 Ferguson classified things as effects if they were “(1)
an identifiable object (2) that wirelessly communicates information
about the object and (3) is linked to sensors that read information about
the object.” 262 Ferguson’s new definition of effects would cover smart
objects that relay data to collecting sensors. 263
The term “‘effects’ in the Fourth Amendment has long been
understood to signify the protection of personal property.” 264 With this
in mind, the Supreme Court has referenced particular objects as effects
such as weapons and fruits of a crime, 265 clothing, 266 automobiles,267
luggage, 268 and other containers. The modern-day approach to effects
seen in Jones focused on the physical search of a car, an effect. 269
Similarly, in Riley, law enforcement searched the digital information
stored on a smartphone, an effect. 270 Ferguson determined that in
Riley, the Court’s “distinction between physical objects and [smart]
objects [broke] new ground for the Supreme Court, opening the door
to perhaps a different analysis for digital information.” 271
According to Ferguson, “the appropriate analysis to determine
whether the communication of [a smart device] can be intercepted and
seized is whether the sensor data and signals fall within the
constitutional interest of a smart effect.” 272 Since the data and signals
are at the core of smart devices, Ferguson argued that both should be
considered part of the redefined Fourth Amendment term effects. 273
Sensor data and signals fall within the constitutional property
interest of a smart device. The Fourth Amendment protects both
tangible 274 and intangible property. 275 Underlying these protections
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275

Id. at 824.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
See United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012).
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381 (2014).
Ferguson, supra note 11, at 834.
Id. at 859.
Id.
See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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over tangible and intangible property is that property is of value to the
user. 276 As Ferguson states, “the data is a valuable part of the
ownership interest in the effect.” 277 The information collected from
smart devices is “largely private, encompassing sensitive home,
personal travel, and health information[,] among other things.” 278
Alexa-enabled smart home devices would fall under
Ferguson’s new definition of effects because the smart home device is
a thing, which emanates data to Amazon’s servers and connects users
to the internet and other smart devices. Alexa-enabled smart home
devices, classified under Ferguson’s definition of effects, would afford
it constitutional protection both in the device and in its contents. The
constitutional property interest that users of smart devices hold is not
just in the physical device but in the data transmitted to Amazon
servers.
An argument against extending the term effects to the data that
the smart device emanates is the view that the user does not exclusively
own the data because the user must share the data with a third party.
In response, the Court has already determined, in regard to CSLI, that
law enforcement needs a warrant to obtain records held by a third party
where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
information. 279 Since the Court determined that law enforcement’s
acquisition of data collected from ceaseless monitoring devices
requires a warrant, Alexa-enabled smart home devices will similarly
require a warrant since the transcripts from Alexa’s recordings will
reveal a user’s past location history.
Moreover, Ferguson purported that for Fourth Amendment
purposes, “coownership does not remove the ability to exclude” 280 data
collected by smart home devices from government interference. Smart
home device owners have “a claim to control the data and a right to
exert a measure of control excluding the government from any attempt
at direct collection.” 281 Thus, it appears that smart devices, as effects,
should be considered among other recognized constitutionally
protected property. 282
276
277
278
279

280
281
282

Ferguson, supra note 11, at 860.
Id.
Id. at 863.
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
Ferguson, supra note 11, at 861.
Id.
Id. at 832. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,177 (1984).
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DIGITAL CURTILAGE FRAMEWORK

Ferguson proposed the theory of digital curtilage as a
framework to address the advancement of technology and the concern
over privacy rights. 283 Although no court has used this framework, it
is relevant to show that this new theory would protect smart home
devices and their data if adopted by courts. This Note discusses
Ferguson’s digital curtilage framework and analyzes how it would
protect Alexa-enabled smart home devices and their data from
unreasonable searches and seizures.
The principles of traditional curtilage inspired Ferguson’s
digital curtilage framework. 284 Ferguson’s digital curtilage theory
aimed to protect “stored data and certain communication signals [that]:
(1) are closely associated with the effect; (2) have been marked out and
claimed as secure from others; and (3) are used to promote personal
autonomy, family, self-expression, and association.” 285 Ferguson
holds that these factors can apply to his expanded definition of the term
effects in the Fourth Amendment. 286 For the application of digital
curtilage towards a smart device, the “smart effect [must] include: (1)
data and signals that are closely associated with the effect; (2) data and
signals that have been marked out and claimed as secure from others;
and (3) data and signals used to promote personal autonomy, family,
self-expression, and association.” 287 Ferguson’s digital curtilage, like
traditional curtilage, provides a fact-based and balanced constitutional
framework. 288
First, digital curtilage will apply towards a smart device that
includes data and signals closely associated with the effect. 289 Data
stored on smart effects, like Alexa-enabled smart home devices, are
closely associated with the device. The user needs to connect to the
device itself to retrieve the data from Alexa-enabled smart home
devices. This demonstrates the close connection between the data
collected and the object that stores the information. Since the data

283
284
285
286
287
288
289

Id. at 809.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 866-67.
Id. at 867.
Id.
Id.
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derives from a constitutionally protected device, under Ferguson’s new
effects definition, it benefits from the derivative protection.
Also relevant in the digital era is the term close, which does not
mean a physical closeness because “the fluidity of data travel,
duplicate, and overcome physical barriers.” 290 Ferguson stated,
“because smart data is part of the thing itself, and because the thing
was designed to communicate smart data, then the data should be
considered closely associated with the effect itself.” 291
Moreover, the data storage and the use of the smart device
becomes a property right which a user can control. Ferguson believed
that “at a minimum, consumers should be able to exclude others from
the digital property.” 292 Ferguson’s theory would cover Alexa-enabled
devices since users can manage and delete their audio recording
transcripts through the Alexa App or by asking Alexa to delete their
recordings. 293
Users can make a strong claim that the data collected from the
Alexa-enabled device is associated with the device. The Alexaenabled smart home device’s purpose is to help homeowners organize
their lives by connecting to the internet and other smart home
appliances and applications. Alexa-enabled smart home devices and
the data they emanate satisfy Ferguson’s first factor to apply digital
curtilage. Ferguson stated, “because the information comes from a
smart device, the data will be considered a part of this smart device…in
the same way the curtilage principle extends protection of the home
outside the home, so digital curtilage extends protection of data outside
the smart effect.” 294
Second, digital curtilage will apply towards a smart device that
includes data and signals that the user marked out and claimed as
secure from others. 295 This part of the test will “narrow the scope of
the protection for certain smart devices.” 296 A user’s exclusion under
these circumstances is evident in the steps taken to secure the smart
device data from others. For example, users can “secure a Wi-Fi

290
291
292
293
294
295
296

Id.
Id.
Id. at 868.
Conner, supra note 248.
Ferguson, supra note 11, at 868.
Id.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol36/iss2/12

40

Sanchez: A New Era: Digital Curtilage

2020

A NEW ERA: DIGITAL CURTILAGE

703

system through encryption.” 297 Likewise, smartphones allow users to
“opt out of locational tracking and other sharing requests.” 298
The “‘marked and claimed as secure’ factor requires an
examination of how the creator of the data interacts with others seeking
to collect data.” 299 Ferguson assumed that since stored data lives
within the effect, a presumption of security exists. 300 He further stated
that “while stored data might remain unencrypted or even unprotected,
because of its location in an effect, it retains constitutional
protection.” 301 This assumption extends existing law that protects
stored data in smartphones. 302 Thus, under this step, courts will need
to examine what actions users took to mark and secure the data from
others. 303
Alexa-enabled smart home devices and the data they transmit
satisfy Ferguson’s second factor to apply digital curtilage. Users of
Alexa-enabled smart home devices can raise a virtual wall to keep
other people from accessing their stored information. The data that
Alexa records is stored unless the user deletes it. A user’s affirmative
act of deleting his Alexa audio recording transcripts by asking Alexa
to delete his recordings will signal a desire to secure the information.
When a user changes the wake word that triggers Alexa to respond and
record, that is evidence that a user took an affirmative act to secure the
device’s use and access.
Ferguson further stated, “even if sophisticated hackers could
thwart these types of security measures, a symbolic statement of
security exists. After all, just because burglars and police can enter
locked houses, it does not mean citizens lose a claim of security behind
those walls.” 304 Alexa-enabled smart home devices carry the option to
secure the data and communications recorded by Alexa. Thus, when
the user takes affirmative steps to claim security in the device, this
factor is satisfied.
Third, digital curtilage will apply towards a smart device that
includes data and signals used to promote personal autonomy, family,
297
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299
300
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self-expression, and association. 305 Ferguson determined that this step
will further refine or limit the protections afforded to these effects. 306
More importantly, “a focus on data and signals from objects linked to
personal or private matters will limit the expanded definition [of
Ferguson’s definition] of effects.” 307
Ferguson recognized that “[p]rotecting only personal and
family-use data is consistent with the intent of traditional, physical
curtilage.” 308 Traditional curtilage protects areas that encourage homelike activities. 309 Similarly, in the digital context, “this understanding
would protect expressive, associational, religious, family, personal,
and dignity interests as opposed to unrevealing or impersonal data.”310
Ferguson’s digital curtilage theory is subject to the same principles
applied in traditional curtilage:
As a result, the Fourth Amendment has been read to
encourage an expansive vision of human development
free from governmental surveillance. Thus, the
personal and family interest argument should not be
seen as a content-based test, but merely a recognition
that many of the things we do (with or without smart
objects) are done for personal growth and development.
While at first blush this distinction might seem
arbitrary, it is the same type of distinction that separates
a protected curtilage space from an unprotected open
field. Constitutionally protected interests are not just
determined by property concepts (where you are
standing) but also by privacy values and concerns about
human autonomy that inform these conceptions of
property (what you could be doing in that space). 311
Protecting only personal and family use data will further refine and
limit the protections afforded to these smart effects.
Alexa-enabled smart home devices promote personal
autonomy, family, self-expression, and association. Alexa recognizes
305
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its user’s voice, which allows the device to personalize the content
shown. 312 The Alexa-enabled smart home device connects users to
their personalized choice of entertainment. Alexa also personalizes a
user’s daily news updates.
Moreover, Alexa-enabled smart home devices allow users to
communicate with anyone, anywhere, at any time. 313 Without
touching any device, users can go through a day’s worth of emails
because Alexa can even read the user’s emails out loud.314
Furthermore, a significant development in Amazon’s smart home
device is its ability to handle and access a user’s patient health
information. Thus, by design Alexa promotes personal autonomy,
family, self-expression, and association.
A strong argument against the theory of digital curtilage is the
requirement that data and signals must be marked out and claimed as
secure from others. Unlike traditional curtilage, where people must
physically take steps to protect the alleged curtilage area from
observation by passersby, digital curtilage does not require tremendous
effort to keep the data secure. According to Ferguson’s theory, a user
of an Alexa-enabled smart home device would only need to change its
wake word to constitute an affirmative act of securing the data.
The digital curtilage framework might be too lenient because it
takes minimal action to show that the user protected the data from
disclosure. This theory does not take into consideration that smart
devices connect and share information with other networks. Many
people download applications on their smart devices, which requires
the dissemination of their information to make their device more
efficient. The requirement to secure the data embedded in smart
devices shared with other sensor devices leads to a potential
technological theory of the third party doctrine. The third party
doctrine holds that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy
in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.” 315 Since
smart devices share a user’s information with other smart devices and
other servers, the government can argue that the information is
therefore not secured.

Alexa Features: News & Information, supra note 71.
Alexa Features: Smart Home, supra note 67.
314 Alexa Features: Productivity, supra note 75.
315 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018) (quoting Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979)).
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CONCLUSION

This Note demonstrated that under current Supreme Court case
law, the Fourth Amendment might extend to the unique Alexa-enabled
smart home devices. The Note also demonstrated that the Fourth
Amendment’s language could, without distortion of its principles,
adopt a modern understanding of the term “effects” to encompass the
smart device and the data that it transmits.
The Note also discussed digital curtilage, a new framework to
constitutionally protect smart devices and the data they emanate from
government interception. Although the Supreme Court of the United
States has not ruled on the constitutionality of law enforcement’s
obtaining Alexa-enabled smart home data, the current case law shows
that a warrant would be required. Based on the Supreme Court’s prior
decisions, the Court leaves the door open for developing new theories
to adapt to the advancement of technology. The theory of digital
curtilage offers society a framework that integrates the nuances of
smart technology and the Fourth Amendment.
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